Recent Posts

Showing posts sorted by date for query SFC. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query SFC. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Tuesday, July 14, 2026

The U.K. Debt/GDP Ratio Is NOT Going To 1000%


The U.K. Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) published its “Fiscal Risks and Sustainability” report (link) and it contains the eye-catching chart above. I will draw your attention to the top line which represents a “worse case” projection of the debt/GDP ratio marching merrily off to 1,000%. I do not expect to be able to pay off on any bets in 2076, but I find it safe to say that the debt/GDP ratio will not do that. Even the low end projection is implausible.

I will first explain why the high projection is nonsensical, which then leads to a discussion why any methodology that produces such a scenario is unsound.

Friday, May 17, 2024

Self-Funding And Deposit Hoarding

Once again, this is an unedited draft of a section that would go into my banking manuscript. It follows onto the previous example.

In the extended example of how new bank loans are self-funding when we look at the entire financial system (including bond markets), one might attempt to critique it based on the idea that the depositors that are the recipients of spending that is financed by new bank loans (which creates deposits that are transferred) might hoard the deposits — preventing re-circulation back to the bank that extended the loans. (Alternatively, recipient banks might hoard reserves.) Such criticisms might seem plausible since the example uses convenient numbers to make life easier for the writer/reader — what happens if behaviour is different?

Wednesday, April 17, 2024

Asset Allocation And Banking

Note: This article would hopefully be worked into my banking manuscript. I think it overlaps other article(s), but I wanted to see how this line of argument looks. Needless to say, I have no put the articles into a single document…

One of the difficulties with understanding banking is that one needs to use relatively complex macro models to see how the formal banking system interacts with the non-bank financial system. Analysis based on looking at the motivations of a single bank or based on models where only the formal banking system exists will be misleading. Stock-flow consistent (SFC) models are one of the few attempts at such a modelling framework.

Wednesday, April 3, 2024

In Defence Of Discrete Time Models

Steve Keen recently wrote “I’m not Discreet, and Neither is Time” in which he discusses the alleged defects of discrete time models as opposed to continuous time ones.

(In discrete time, the model state is defined on a time axis that can be labelled as integers: step 1, step 2, etc. In a continuous time, a model’s time axis is the real axis. A discrete time model can be thought of as being defined by difference equations, while continuous time is normally defined by differential equations.)

Tuesday, June 13, 2023

Sellers' Inflation

Note: this is an unedited draft from my inflation primer manuscript. It is relatively lightweight, partly because I want to avoid getting too deep into controversial theories in that book. I might add material closer to publication.

One area of controversy that showed up after 2020 was about the role of “price gouging” in the overall rise in inflation. (This idea was satirically referred to as “greedflation.”) This has been an area of theoretical dispute between post-Keynesians and mainstream economists (as post-Keynesians argued in favour of a conflict theory of inflation), although it was not that a well-known dispute until after the pandemic. The obvious reason is that most people are not going to loudly argue about the sources of inflation when it was stuck near 2%.

Since I do not want this text to stray too far into theoretical disputes, I will just outline the ideas behind this debate.

Weber and Wasner Article

Isabella M. Weber and Evan Wasner published the article “Sellers’ Inflation, Profits and Conflict: Why can Large Firms Hike Prices in an Emergency?” in 2023. The authors argue that the conventional story that inflation is always macroeconomic is incorrect, rather it can have microeconomic origins.

The abstract of the paper summarises how they saw the inflation process developing in this instance.

We review the longstanding literature on price-setting in concentrated markets and survey earnings calls and compile firm-level data to derive a three-stage heuristic of the inflationary process: (1) Rising prices in systemically significant upstream sectors due to commodity market dynamics or bottlenecks create windfall profits and provide an impulse for further price hikes. (2) To protect profit margins from rising costs, downstream sectors propagate, or in cases of temporary monopolies due to bottlenecks, amplify price pressures. (3) Labor responds by trying to fend off real wage declines in the conflict stage.

This fits within the wider literature of “conflict inflation” that characterises the post-Keynesian literature. The authors contrast this from a “macroeconomic” viewpoint, where inflation is the result of something like GDP growing above “potential GDP,” the unemployment rate being below the “The Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment” (NAIRU), or rapid “money” growth.

This does not correspond to “the inflation after the pandemic was the result of firms getting greedier than they were in 2019” (as some critics attempted to downplay the idea), rather it is a process that required concentration in “systemically significant upstream sectors.” There are always some firms raising prices to see whether they can pad profits, the issue is that there needs to be a mechanism for price hikes to propagate.

This idea fits in to the existing literature on “conflict inflation.” Conflict inflation is the standard post-Keynesian explanation for the inflation process. The mainstream view on conflict inflation is mixed. American neoclassical economists tend to reject the idea out of hand, while European mainstream economists were more sympathetic to the idea. The American stance tends to have a higher profile, presumably because they have stronger views on the topic.

Inflation Control Implications?

For reasons that I will discuss below, it is going to be hard to come up with conclusive analytical evidence either way on this topic if we look at outcomes under the current economic structures. The differences between the views show up more in terms of offering different policy options to combat inflation.

Given that I am not in the policy advocacy business, nor do I want to discuss unresolvable theoretical disputes in this text, I will not pursue this angle. However, the policy implications of the concept are why it matters. If one is only interested in forecasting inflation in the current policy environment, it is somewhat hard to distinguish between this concept and others.

Why I Like the Concept

I believe that the mechanism described in the Weber and Wasner article was a factor behind the inflation spike (although I will note theoretical concerns later). The authors give examples of firms taking advantage of the situation to push through price hikes, and how they fit in with the story.

The advantages of this story versus conventional theories is that we had an inflation spike at the right time.

  • If one wants to blame “money printing” for inflation, why was there no inflation in Japan when they pioneered “Quantitative Easing,” or most of the major economies after 2008?

  • If one wants to blame “fiscal deficits,” we then can make pretty much the same response as in the previous point.

  • Trying to use the unemployment rate to explain inflation (e.g., the so-called “Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU)”) fails horribly. Inflation spiked when the unemployment rate was still quite high yet started to moderate even though the unemployment rate eventually hit low levels.

In summary, the supply chain disruptions were what distinguished the post-pandemic period from the rest of the post-1990 period, and that was the only period where inflation broke out. The supply chain disruptions were what gave “upstream firms” to ram through price hikes under this story.

Theoretical Concerns

At the time of writing, this line of argument is currently being debated, and I think the discussion will continue to shift. I have not seen an analysis that is truly conclusive one way or another.

The main difficulty is always going to be determining how much of the rise in inflation is due to rising profits. One method would be to try to estimate the effect company by company. The problem is that the ability to undertake such a survey is limited, and we need to question the reliability of things like statements on corporate earnings calls. Given that collusion to fix prices is illegal in some jurisdictions, corporate executives might shy away from stating that they did that publicly. Unless some form of survey was legally mandated to be submitted to national statistical agencies, it is going to be hard to connect anecdotal reports to the overall price index in a systematic fashion.

An alternative is that we could look at aggregate profits in the economy and attempt to assign contributions to overall price changes to the change in profits.

The previous figure shows “Corporate Profits with Inventory Valuation Adjustment (IVA) and Capital Consumption Adjustment (CCAdj)” as a percentage of national income from 2015-2022. There was an increase in the profit share after the disruptions in 2020, so one might try to argue that reflects companies padding profit margins.

The problem with this aggregate profit accounting story is the Kalecki/Levy Profit Equation. I discuss this equation in Section 4.2 of my book Recessions: Volume I. If we use a simplified version of the national accounts, the equation is:

Profits = (Net Investment) – (Household Savings) + (Dividend Payments) + (Government Fiscal Deficit) – (Net Imports).

(In the real world, the national accounts are more complicated, and there are more entries to the equation.) Importantly, this is not an opinion or theoretical model – it is an accounting identity. (An accounting identity is an equation that is true by definition – it just tells us how accounting entries add up when there are no errors in measuring the accounting entries.)

Although we could attempt to pin down the initial terms of the equation (net investment, housing savings, and dividends) by tying them to corporate pricing strategy within a model, the fiscal deficit and the trade deficit are determined by government policy and the state of the macroeconomy. Even if every firm in the economy wanted to raise its forecast profit margins, there is no guarantee that aggregate profits would rise.

An alternative way of viewing this concern is that one could create an economic model where prices and wages are constant. (For example, this describes many of the models I developed in my earlier book, An Introduction to SFC Models Using Python.) Even though profit margins on production are constant, profits in the model will still rise and fall due to other variables changing in the simulation.

Although the decomposition approach looks like the natural approach to test the theory, this is not necessarily the case. If the price hikes are being rammed through by “upstream” industries with pricing power, this results in downward pressure on the profits the “downstream” industries. Meanwhile, wages are also expected to rise.

If we move away from a “decomposition approach,” we face an additional concern: how much predictive value the concept has? It is one thing to have an explanation based on price hikes that have already happened and discussed in corporate earnings calls, it is another to have a forward-looking explanation that can be used to predict inflation. Why did we have no profit-driven inflation spikes from 1995-2020? Will we always need a disruption as large as the pandemic shutdown to have a repeat?

“Excuseflation”

We can then run into variant idea, which was dubbed “excuseflation,” which was discussed in a Bloomberg Odd Lots episode by Tracy Alloway and Joe Weisenthal ( URL in references.). Excuseflation is the observation that it is a lot easier for a firm to find an excuse to raise prices when other prices are rising. If a lot of other prices are rising markedly, it is a lot easier to sneak in price hikes that raise profit margins.

Although I think that is a good description of the psychology, we run into a theoretical problem. Saying that people are observing other prices shoot up is very hard to distinguish from those people forecasting higher inflation. This means that this is very hard to distinguish from the mainstream concept of “inflation expectations” – at least if we take a broad definition of “inflation expectations.”

Concluding Remarks

There was certainly a greater interest in the idea that price increases were the result of corporations trying to raise their profit margins after the pandemic disruptions. At the time of writing, it is still unclear whether it will shift how “mainstream” entities like central banks view inflation. My view is that it will be hard to find any data that can convincingly demonstrate an aggregate effect, although we certainly can find individual firms jacking up their prices and increasing their profitability.

The debate about the role of profit padding in inflation might result in a different perspective on how to control inflation, but that is outside the scope of this text.

References

Email subscription: Go to https://bondeconomics.substack.com/ 

(c) Brian Romanchuk 2023

Tuesday, May 24, 2022

How I Learned To Stop Worrying And Love Shadow Banking...

I had an article planned and started, but I got caught up with events. Instead, I just wanted to make a few comments about the dreaded “shadow banking” sector — non-bank finance. I had seen a few articles complaining about lack of regulation and risks posed by shadow banks, which I think is just extrapolating the last financial crisis.

Friday, May 6, 2022

Credit Growth And Recession Forecasting

The tail end of my three-part discussion of banking (link) ended with the argument that the circular nature of funding flows means that they do not represent a constraint on debt growth, instead the willingness (and ability) to absorb credit risk is the constraint. If we accept this, there is an important implication for our ability to forecast recessions that are driven by a contraction in “animal spirits.” I outlined this argument in the first volume of my (planned) two part texts on recessions. (I only have parts of the second volume completed, as I hit some difficult areas that I feel I need to think about more carefully.)

I only have an informal version of the argument, and it runs as follows. The usual driver of a business expansion is private investment, which normally needs to financing by the firms/households that are investing. This implies a need for financial firms to be willing to extend credit. This willingness — the “animal spirits” of firms and financiers — thus drives the cycle. So far, this is pretty much what Keynes wrote. The wrinkle — which may or may not be original — is that the credit markets are in fact markets. If we could predict credit market trends, that largely implies the ability to time markets. Which implies that recession forecasting runs into some version of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis.

There is a lot of academic controversy about the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, which I am not interested in. I am referring to a simplistic version of it: if you think you can predict the direction of markets reliably, why are you publishing academic articles and not on a yacht somewhere? My belief is that this is close to the intent of post-Keynesian views on the business cycle, but they do not frame it this way due to being allergic “market efficiency,” and so they use more confusing terminology to explain the concepts I discuss here.

Not All Recessions Credit-Driven

Although most historical recessions were associated with slowdowns in debt growth, it is possible for the economy to contract for other reasons — and such a possibility is a key risk at present. The figure above shows non-financial debt growth in the United States, along with recessions shading. We can see that credit growth historically coincided with slowing debt growth. In recent decades, the Savings and Loan Crisis was associated with the 1990 recession, the 2000 recession was associated with technology firms losing access to credit markets, and the 2008 recession was notoriously a debt crisis. These are the types of recessions I see as difficult to forecast.

However, we also can recessions driven by other causes — which force us to forecast those other drivers. We can have a policy-induced recession (e.g., Euro periphery), where we need to forecast policy. The recent recession was driven by a pandemic (and the response to the pandemic), which is a medical forecasting problem. We can also have downturns triggered by things like the loss of energy imports.

Currently, the most pressing problems seem to be of this type: the renewed lockdown in China, and the effects of constricted energy (and food) supplies. A credit contraction might be triggered by these events, but it is hard to see credit as the driver of any slowdown. As such, the comments here are not aimed at the current situation.

Problem for Macro Models

Credit risk being the constraint for debt growth is a problem for most macroeconomic models — agent-based models being the notable exception. It is hard for a mathematical model to capture the uncertainty associated with credit risk, and the tendency of risk appetites to change.

As a starting point, take the simplest macro model structure: stock-flow consistent (SFC) models. (I have a book on building SFC models in Python.) A SFC model has two categories of equations:

  1. equations that define the accounting structure of the model (“accounting identities”), and

  2. equations that determine the behaviour of sectors (that are constrained by the previous type of equations).

The arguments in my banking article can be re-phrased as follows: the accounting identities do not limit debt growth, rather it is driven entirely by behaviour.

We could imagine a model where there are some parameters in the model that act as a “credit growth” factor. That is, the model will settle in at a certain pace of private sector debt growth once other variables enter steady growth states. To then model a credit-driven recession, we could have the parameter(s) jump to new values that reduce debt growth, and this then has a knock-on effect on growth.

Although this technique will create a “teaching model” that helps explain why recessions occur, the problem is that it does not help forecasting. We need to forecast the parameter shift that leads to lower credit growth, which is no easier than forecasting a recession in the first place.

We could assume that the “credit growth parameters” are driven by variables within the model. We might then be able to forecast the parameter changes. However, that implies that we could use this technique to predict market developments (and therefore be on our way to yacht ownership).

DSGE Models?

DSGE models have notorious difficulties with credit. The entire premise of the models is that entities (households, firms) have a starting amount of tradeable goods and services, and then they trade these endowments amongst themselves to reach an optimal outcome.

“Money” in these models correspond to government money, created by policy, and so policy rules constrain its growth. Since those models are typically mainly used to discuss policy, this is not a problem.

The addition of private credit creates inherent problems with the optimisation-driven strategy of these models.

  • The models are built around forward prices of everything that are traded in forward markets. If firms can buy and sell everything forward, there is no fundamental uncertainty that can lead to defaults.

  • Since private credit “comes out of thin air,” there is no initial “endowment” for trading. Trying to impose a repayment constraint (“no Ponzi condition”) runs into the problem that if every firm can issue credit, there is no reason for nominal income growth to result in a finite limit if nominal interest rates are bounded. All the entities in the private sector can grow their balance sheets in concert, creating nominal income that allows for debt service.

  • The models rely upon representative agents that stand in for a sector, or part of a sector. If they are indeed representative, all the firms that are represented would default at the same time.

The methodology is not suited to handle credit risk, and so the best that can be hoped for is adding some heuristic behaviour that allegedly captures credit dynamics. We end up in the same position as SFC models: we need to forecast changes in model parameters.

Agent-Based Models

Agent-based models are in a better position to capture credit dynamics, since they have entities that face the same information limitations that face lenders and borrowers in the real world. As such, it should be possible to create models that generate business cycles driven by credit.

The problem with such models is attempting to fit them to observed data, as they contain an extremely large number of state variables. Although there is research moving in that direction, the fitting problem is always going to be difficult to solve.

Concluding Remarks

Mathematical economic models have a difficult time with modelling credit dynamics, since they are driven by herd psychology. They might be able to explain why the economy contracts if lending seizes up, but predicting such a seizure is just as difficult as predicting the direction of markets.

Email subscription: Go to https://bondeconomics.substack.com/ 

(c) Brian Romanchuk 2022

Monday, February 21, 2022

Geopolitics And Uncertainty

At the time of writing, there are considerable fears about the diplomatic situation between Russia and Ukraine. One complaint I have seen multiple times that people were annoyed that macro analysts were opining on the topic, despite a lack of qualifications in international relations. Although that might feel satisfying, the reality is that macro analysis is quite literally the analysis of everything going on in the world, and so you have little choice but to have opinions on a wide range of topics. Although one might hope that one can focus on technical issues within markets (essentially, relative value analysis), but even there, it is very difficult to avoid macro.

Sunday, February 6, 2022

New SFC Models Feature: "Flexprice" Solver

In response to a query from a user, I added a new feature to my sfc_models Python package. This article discusses the feature. There is not any economic analysis tied to this, other than perhaps being of interest to people who have not looked at these models. (My book An Introduction to SFC Models Using Python describes my software package.)

Please note that I added the feature without looking into how other modellers have dealt with these issues.

The script that runs the example models in this article is found in the examples of the development branch of sfc_models: https://github.com/brianr747/SFC_models/blob/development/sfc_models/examples/scripts/ex20220206_flexprice_intro.py This code will not work in the “production” branch — which is what is installed by pip. Users would need to understand how to work with GitHub (and Python paths) to be able to access this feature.

Thursday, July 1, 2021

Towards A MVP ABM


I have been catching up on some of my programming backlog, and I think I am in position to aim for a minimum viable product (MVP) version of my Python agent-based model (ABM) project. The figure above shows the visible progress made so far — which is not not at first glance an economic simulation. (In case you are wondering, the green balls are planets, and the blue box is supposed to be a spaceship flying between them. Or the balls could be island cities in an ocean at night, and the blue box is a container ship. Whatever.)

The challenge I face with this project is that every single aspect can explode in complexity, and so I can be paralysed by the need to deal with every potential quirk in the simulation. For this reason, I need to force myself to aim at a MVP, and worry about the cut corners later.

Monday, May 17, 2021

Status Update On My Agent-Based Model Dabbling

I have had a bit more time to work on my Python agent-based model project. As I discussed earlier, I am migrating the discussion of my open source projects to a new Patreon. As I have noted repeatedly, a consulting project has slowed me down, so progress on that front has been slow. I just want to give a bit of a summary of how things are going, from the perspective of someone who is interested in the modelling, but not the coding bits.

Thursday, March 25, 2021

Book Review: Agent-Based Models In Economics: A Toolkit

The book Agent-Based Models in Economics: A Toolkit (Amazon affiliate link) is a collection of articles edited by by Domenico Delli Gatti, Giorgio Fagiolo, Mauro Gallegati, Matteo Richiardi, and Alberto Russo. (I will refer to them as "the editors" in this article...) I picked up this book as it appears aimed at my new interest in agent-based models. 

Given the diversity of the articles within the text, I will not attempt to make this an academic book review, instead being closer to a book review on an online book store: who would be interested in buying this book? The book is somewhat more "literary" in style than I hoped for, but it might be of interest for those who enjoy economic theory controversies.

Thursday, February 11, 2021

The Great Vacation: Recessions In DSGE Models (Part II)

The Great Vacation Effect is what I term one well-known pathological side effect of almost all macro dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models: since employment hours are a voluntary decision in the household optimisation problem the direct implication that unemployment is voluntary as well. As such, The Great Depression can be interpreted as The Great Vacation. Although this silliness is well known, the silliness has nasty side effects for recession analysis. This article continues the discussion of the previous part, turning to the question of why this effect matters even if we suspend disbelief with respect to the interpretation of unemployment. 

Sunday, November 8, 2020

Roger Farmer's Work: A Bridge Between Heterodoxy And The Mainstream?

I am now returning to my work on recession analysis, covering the background research that will make its way into the second volume of recessions. I have more work to do on nonlinear DSGE models, but my argument is that they are not inherently that interesting, given their mathematical intractability. Yes, you can tell stories with them -- but so what? I can tell stories any number of ways, all of them more interesting.

Rather than chase after hundreds of papers that I think are uninteresting and will be rapidly made obsolete by the ongoing wave of research, I would rather focus on a niche area that I think is interesting. Roger E. Farmer has been publishing models for some time that fit within the broad neoclassical tradition, yet have some similarities to post-Keynesian thinking. The book Prosperity for All (Amazon affiliate link) gives a readable introduction to his work.

Wednesday, October 7, 2020

"Reading The Stars": Best Introduction To DSGE Macro?

I ran across the IMF working paper "Reading the Stars" by Peter D. Williams, Yasser Abdih, and Emanuel Kopp. I have only scanned the paper quickly, but it appears to be in line with similar papers that I previously read. My argument here is that this paper -- or content very similar to it -- would be the best starting chapter for a book that attempts to explain Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) macro theory to readers who have existing math skills. It is effectively a survey of the useful empirical applications of DSGE macro.

This is the introductory article in a series that will attempt such a feat of exposition. I am attempting to explain why this paper in particular is the best starting point, but without the technical arguments. However, the technical arguments will be bewildering if we do not know what the objective of the exercise is.

Wednesday, September 2, 2020

On Fiscal Sustainability

One frequently encounters variations of the phrase “unsustainable debt trajectory” (or similar) in statements by mainstream economists. The phrase is popular as it offers what appears to be a sophisticated criticism of a fiscal policy stance that is disapproved of, but without having any substantive content that can be used to rebut the speaker. Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) largely rejects that “debt sustainability” has theoretical validity for a floating currency sovereign.

(Note: This is a re-written unedited draft of a manuscript section on fiscal sustainability. Material was added to a previously published draft.)

Thursday, July 9, 2020

What Is MMT? (Short Version)

One of the unusual things about Modern Monetary Theory is that many non-MMTers have a hard time understanding what it is. Although it would be reasonable to argue that this reflects communications issue by MMT proponents, I am not entirely comfortable with that characterisation. I had no issues picking up the theory, and the same could be said for the relatively large number of activists who have come from non-economics backgrounds. Many of the complaints about understanding MMT come from people who either work in finance or have a background in economics – which raises a question why they are having these difficulties.

Note: This is an unedited introductory section from my manuscript. It will be the second section, and designed to offer a minimal introduction to MMT. The rest of the book will give more details, but I want readers to at least have an idea of what MMT is in case they just jump to the MMT criticism chapter.

Tuesday, April 14, 2020

Why Fiscal Sustainability Is An Unsustainable Concept

One frequently encounters variations of the phrase "unsustainable debt trajectory" (or similar) in statements by mainstream economists. The phrase is popular as it offers what appears to be a sophisticated criticism of some fiscal policy setting that is disapproved of, but without having any content that can be used to prove the speaker wrong. Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) largely rejects that "debt sustainability" has theoretical validity for a floating currency sovereign. I will focus on the analysis of a paper by Scott Fulwiler to justify this stance.

(Note: This article is a draft section in a chapter on fiscal policy in my MMT primer. I will cover some important concepts in earlier sections, but not repeat them here. The first is the notion that inflation is the constraint on fiscal policy, which comes from Functional Finance (primer). The next concept is that a floating currency sovereign can always avoid default. I would note that this chapter is covering much of the material seen in Chapter 7 of Understanding Government Finance.)

Wednesday, March 25, 2020

Money Printer Go Brrr ... And No Inflation?

Figure: U.S. Breakeven Inflation, Real Yield
Although a big fiscal package is in the pipeline (admittedly the Greatest Deliberative Body in the World is playing its usual log-rolling games), smashed supply, and rampant "money printing" (ha!), breakeven inflation in the United States is cratering (figure above). This is exactly what should have happened, although the big question is whether current pricing is an overshoot of fundamentals. (I leave that market call to the reader.) I outline why this puzzling inflation perspective is the correct call -- top down inflation analysis will not work, we need to go bottom up.

Wednesday, January 8, 2020

MMT And Price Level Determination

What determines the price level is a theoretical topic that pops up in Mosler's White Paper on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT - link to my discussion). Mosler's argument is that only MMT provides a proper understanding of price level determination. That is a strong claim, and difficult to assess. However, the discussion of price level determination is a distinctive part of MMT, and should receive greater prominence in discussion.